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 Although privatization has exerted a stronghold over economic policy, 
several countries have cycled back and forth between privatization and 
nationalization. In several Latin American countries, governments have 
conducted a round of privatization followed by expropriation and 
nationalization. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, privatization-
nationalization cycles are less common, and private property rights are 
more likely to remain entrenched. This Article analyzes privatization and 
nationalization—and by extension, private property rights—from a 
comparative constitutional perspective. Through analyzing rounds of 
privatizations in three countries—Argentina, Mexico, and the U.K.—this 
Article argues that two constitutional mechanisms impact the 
privatization-nationalization cycle: executive power and legislative 
entrenchment. Large grants of executive power and a lack of legislative 
entrenchment can allow governments to swiftly alter private property 
rights, shifting economic regimes from privatization to nationalization. 
Thus, this Article suggests that privatizing nations curb executive power 
and entrench legislation to advance private property rights. By 
establishing constitutional safeguards on executive and legislative 
power, privatizing governments are more likely to promote private 
property rights, entrench privatization, and foster economic development 
in their countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Privatization has exerted a stronghold over economic policy, both in 
developing1 and developed nations.2 Global leaders have hailed 
privatization as a means for economic development3 and democracy.4 
  
 1. See, e.g., Edward C. Snyder, The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress 
Toward a Hemispheric Free Trade Area, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 95, 96 (1994). 
 2. David Marsh, Privatization Under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Literature, 
69 PUB. ADMIN. 459, 459 (1991). 
 3. See, e.g., Carla Davidovich, Note, The Selling of Argentina: Is the Path to the 
First World Privatized?, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 151, 151 (1996) (describing 
President Carlos Menem’s thoughts on privatization); Alistair Osborne, Margaret 
Thatcher: One Policy That Led to More Than 50 Companies Being Sold or Privatized, 
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Several countries have also encouraged privatization through 
constitutionalizing a variety of provisions, including the right to own 
private property.5  
Despite such a strong popular and constitutional consensus around 
privatization, several countries have cycled back and forth between 
privatization and nationalization.6 For example, several Latin American 
governments have conducted a round of privatization followed by a 
round of expropriation and renationalization.7 By contrast, European 
governments have privatized state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) without 
cycling back toward nationalization.8  
Scholars have yet to analyze why certain countries fall into a 
privatization-nationalization cycle, but others do not. Although a few 
scholars have examined the privatization-nationalization cycle on a more 
micro-level—for example, Professor Amy Chua focuses her scholarship 
on the underlying causes of the cycle9—scholars have largely failed to 
identify why the cycle is nonexistent in some countries.  
Other scholars have offered different explanations of the cycle. David 
Bushnell and Neill Macaulay, for instance, hypothesize that countries 
  
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/alistair-
osborne/9980292/Margaret-Thatcher-one-policy-that-led-to-more-than-50-companies-
being-sold-or-privatised.html (describing Prime Minister Thatcher’s views on 
privatization).  
 4. CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 128-29 (1992). 
 5. See, e.g., Art. 17, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) 
(safeguarding private property rights in Argentina); see also CONST. (1987), art. XIII, sec. 
8 (Phil.) (noting that the government will encourage “privatization of public sector 
enterprises”).  
 6. See, e.g., Werner Baer & Gabriel Montes-Rojas, From Privatization to Re-
Nationalization: What Went Wrong with Privatizations in Argentina, 36 OXFORD DEV. 
STUD. 323, 324 (2008); Degol Hailu et al., Privatization and Renationalization: What 
Went Wrong in Bolivia’s Water Sector?, 40 WORLD DEV. 2564, 2564 (2012). 
 7. See supra note 6 (referring to all sources cited). 
 8. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 2, at 459; Heather M. Stack, Note, The 
“Colonization” of East Germany?: A Comparative Analysis of German Privatization, 46 
DUKE L.J. 1211, 1248 (1997). 
 9. See generally Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The 
Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 
(1995) (noting that ethnic hatred may influence a country’s decision to renationalize).  
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privatize or nationalize in response to global geopolitical events, for 
example the fall of the Soviet Union or the Great Depression.10 Bushnell 
and Macaulay’s hypothesis, however, does not fully explain certain 
facets of the privatization-nationalization cycle: the U.K.’s privatization 
before the fall of the Soviet Union,11 and Argentina’s renationalization of 
some enterprises in 2001.12  
In sharp contrast to Bushnell and Macaulay’s focus on global events, 
William Glade focuses on internal events and posits that countries 
privatize in response to economic necessity.13 Although Glade’s theory 
may describe some countries’ justification for privatizing, Glade’s theory 
does not explain why countries like Argentina renationalize after a round 
of privatization.14 
Thus, to fill the void in the literature, this Article analyzes why certain 
countries renationalize and others do not. This Article further provides 
constitutional and policy prescriptions for controlling the privatization-
nationalization cycle and preserving private property rights. To engage in 
this analysis, this Article compares and contrasts privatizations in three 
countries: Argentina, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. This Article 
studies these three countries for two reasons. First, Mexico and the U.K. 
have not renationalized since privatization in the late 1980s and early 
1990s,15 but Argentina has renationalized since privatization in the 
1990s.16 Second, all three countries are members of the G20,17 
  
 10. DAVID BUSHNELL & NEILL MACAULAY, THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN AMERICA 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 183, 189 (1988). 
 11. The U.K.’s privatization plan was set in 1979. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 
460. 
 12. Baer & Montes-Rojas, supra note 6, at 324.  
 13. William Glade, The Contexts of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 4, 15 (William Glade ed. 1991). 
 14. See generally id. (discussing the factors that cause countries to privatize but 
not discussing any factors that may trigger renationalization). 
 15. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 461 (noting the growth of the U.K.’s privatization 
program); id. at 459 (acknowledging that the U.K.’s privatization program is a blueprint 
for other countries that wish to privatize state-owned enterprises); see also 2013 
Investment Climate Statement – Mexico, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 2013),  
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204693.htm [hereinafter Mexico Investment 
Climate]. 
 16. Baer & Montes-Rojas, supra note 6, at 324. 
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“economies whose size or strategic importance gives them a particularly 
crucial role in the global economy.”18  
This Article makes three claims. First, to avoid renationalization, 
privatizing countries should curb executive power. Executive power need 
not be severely limited; instead, the limitations should curb the 
executive’s unilateral ability to modify existing laws and regulations. 
Limited executive power enshrines permanence and increases ownership 
and investment.19 Thus, by reducing executive power, countries are less 
likely to renationalize. Conversely, countries with increased executive 
power—in particular, countries that unilaterally allow their presidents to 
contravene existing legislation—are more likely to sanction swift 
changes in property rights and longstanding practices.20 
In the context of this Article, Argentina renationalized partly because 
it concentrates considerable executive power in the hands of its 
executive. Argentine presidents may unilaterally repeal legislation 
through executive decrees.21 Such decrees may enable presidents to 
renationalize rapidly.22 By contrast, Mexico and the U.K. do not grant 
their executives the same level of executive power, especially with 
regard to privatization.23 Therefore, they are less likely to fall into the 
privatization-nationalization cycle and are more likely to safeguard 
private property rights.24  
Second, a claim that is plausible but not provable in the context of this 
Article, is that countries that legislatively entrench and perpetuate private 
property rights are less likely to renationalize. Legislative entrenchment 
commits the government to a particular policy preference, in this case 
  
 17. G20 Members, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/g20/g20-members.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
 18. About, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION DEV., http://www.oecd.org/g20/about.htm 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
 19. Ricardo J. Caballero, On the Sign of the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship, 
81 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1991). 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
 21. See ELANA SHEVER, RESOURCES FOR REFORM: OIL AND NEOLIBERALISM IN 
ARGENTINA 206 n.4 (2012). 
 22. See infra Part V.A. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
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privatization, which increases predictability, ownership, and 
investment.25 In the context of this Article, countries making a legislative 
commitment to privatization were more likely to have successful 
privatization programs. For instance, Mexico had trouble attracting 
ownership and investment in 1989 partly because the Mexican Congress 
did not codify private property rights in legislation.26 By contrast, the 
British Parliament compensated for its inherent inability to entrench 
legislation by making several legislative commitments to privatization.27 
While discussing legislative entrenchment, this Article acknowledges 
that certain regimes are structurally incapable of entrenching laws. For 
example, the U.K. Parliament cannot bind successive Parliaments.28 
Thus, in cases where entrenchment is impossible, this Article 
recommends a system of tacit entrenchment: by privatizing state-owned 
enterprises in different legislative terms, a country can reiterate its 
commitment to private ownership and investment. Tacit entrenchment, 
therefore, may replicate the benefits of entrenchment in regimes that 
cannot legislatively entrench various policies.29 
  
 25. Legislative entrenchment is particularly important because it “enables a 
government to make a credible commitment that it will not hold up a person from whom 
it seeks certain actions.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: 
A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1671 (2002). Entrenchment not only makes 
repealing legislation difficult, but may also make passing legislation a more deliberative 
endeavor. By contrast, legislatures lacking legislative entrenchment may be less likely to 
deliberate extensively. Id. at 1693. In the context of privatization, entrenchment 
“enshrine[s]” certainty in a country’s legal system and helps attract investors. PIERRE 
GUISLAIN, THE PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE: A STRATEGIC, LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 294 (1997).    
 26. Michael W. Goldman et al., An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in 
Mexico, 5 IND. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 101, 113 (1994). 
 27. The U.K. Parliament is not bound by its predecessors. MARY COLLINS, AS 
LEVEL LAW 50 (2000). Even though the U.K. is not a paradigmatic example of legislative 
entrenchment, the U.K. has still managed to perpetuate private property rights. Thus, this 
Article argues that the U.K. has tacitly entrenched private property rights through 
privatizing various state-owned companies and conducting privatization during different 
legislative terms; in doing so, the U.K. has signaled to investors that it favors 
privatization over expropriation and private ownership over collectivism. See infra Part 
V.B. 
 28. COLLINS, supra note 27, at 50. 
 29. See infra Part V.B. 
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Third, to curb populist pressure to renationalize, privatizing countries 
should adopt modernization agreements. Such agreements mandate that 
privatizers modernize certain services and deliver noticeable benefits to 
the populace.30 From a distributional perspective, modernization 
agreements ensure that privatizations confer benefits to all segments of 
the citizenry, thereby increasing social and consumer welfare.31 
Privatization’s distributional results are paramount because governments 
often market privatization programs as a means to cure economic ills.32 
In law and economics terms, privatization is often marketed as a Pareto 
improvement, an outcome that makes no one worse off.33 Yet, several 
privatizations have led to a maldistribution of resources, making the 
polity worse off than before.34 Such results, then, serve as a rallying cry 
for renationalization.35 Curbing populist discontent, therefore, requires 
that privatization’s benefits are spread as widely as possible. A wide 
disbursement of benefits increases popular support for private property 
  
 30. See, e.g., A. Botelho & C. Addis, Privatization of Telecommunications in 
Mexico, in LESSONS FROM PRIVATIZATION: LABOUR ISSUES IN DEVELOPING AND 
TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 71, 83 (Rolph van der Hoeven & György Sziráczki eds., 1997) 
(providing an example of a concession agreement requiring a privatizer to modernize a 
country’s telephone system); Xun Wu & Nepomuceno A. Malaluan, A Tale of Two 
Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water Privatisation in Metro Manila, 45 URB. 
STUD. 207, 215, 226 (2008) (providing an example of a concession agreement requiring a 
privatizer to modernize a city’s water system).  
 31. See CHILE: RECENT POLICY LESSONS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 322-23 
(Guillermo Perry & Danny M. Leipziger, eds. 1999) [hereinafter CHILE] (noting that 
citizen-centric policies during privatization increase consumer welfare); Raúl González 
Pietrogiovanna, The Benefits of Privatization? The Mexican Experience in the 
Telecommunications Industry 12 (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/events/2008-09/Gonzalez_Pietrogiovanna.pdf.) 
 32. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 1, at 96 (noting the Argentine government 
marketed privatization as means to revitalize Argentina’s economy).  
 33. Robert N. Stavins et al., Interpreting Sustainability in Economic Terms: 
Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 341 (2003). 
 34. Alberto Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, The Truth About Privatization 
in Latin America 19-20 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. R-486, 2003). 
 35. LUIGI MANZETTI, NEOLIBERALISM, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REFORM FAILURES 
IN EMERGING MARKETS 180 (2010). 
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rights and decreases the likelihood that populist concerns will dismantle 
protections for private ownership.36  
To make these three claims, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I 
provides an overview of this Article’s methodology, offering definitions 
for privatization, the privatization-nationalization cycle, and economic 
liberties. Part I also describes how this Article will study privatizations in 
each country. Parts II, III, and IV describe privatizations in Argentina, 
Mexico, and the U.K., respectively. Part V summarizes my findings in 
Parts II through IV. Additionally, Part V provides constitutional and 
economic policy prescriptions that can enable privatizing countries to 
avoid renationalization and preserve private property rights in the long 
run. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  Key Definitions 
In the context of this Article, privatization is defined as the sale of 
“majority . . . ownership in historically state-owned [enterprises]” 
(“SOEs”).37 Privatization transfers SOEs’ ownership from the 
government to the private sector. Nationalization refers to the transfer of 
ownership from the private sector to the government.38 
This Article defines the privatization-nationalization cycle as having 
three or more phases: nationalization, privatization, followed by 
renationalization. Thus, if a country falls into the privatization-
nationalization cycle, the country has renationalized previously 
privatized SOEs. By contrast, a country has avoided the privatization-
nationalization cycle if privatized industries remain privatized. 
  
 36. See E. Sam Overman, Privatization in China, Mexico, and Russia: A 
Comparative Study, 19 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 46, 52-53 (1995). 
 37. Leslie Elliot Armijo, Menem’s Mania?: The Timing of Privatization in 
Argentina, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1, 6 (1994). 
 38. Chua, supra note 9, at 226-27. 
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Lastly, in the context of this Article, economic liberties are defined as 
“the right to acquire, use, and possess private property and the right to 
enter into private contracts of one’s choosing.”39  
B.  Privatization Studies 
Scholars have studied privatization in various ways.40 Because this 
Article engages in a comparative study of privatization, this Article 
employs the methodology used in Heather Stack’s comparative note on 
German privatization.41 In her note, Stack engages in a three-part 
analysis: first, she describes the political and economic factors leading to 
privatization; second, she discusses the privatization’s legal framework; 
third, she analyzes the results of privatization.42 This Article employs 
Stack’s methodology because Stack’s note, like this Article, critiques 
existing privatization policies and focuses on the history and legal 
structure of various privatizations.43 Thus, Stack’s methodology seems 
particularly fitting for this Article’s substantive focus and comparative 
approach.  
  
 39. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (2012). 
 40. Chua, supra note 9, at 227-238 (engaging in a historical analysis that focuses 
on the role of foreigners in privatization); Wu & Malaluan, supra note 30, at 214-19 
(engaging in an analysis that focuses on the privatizer’s corporate governance and 
financial stability).   
 41. Stack, supra note 8, at 1214. 
 42. This Article follows the methodology employed in Parts I and II of Stack’s 
note. See id.  
 43. Id. Stack’s critique, however, does not focus on constitutional and political 
issues. See id. 
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II.  PRIVATIZATION IN ARGENTINA 
A.  Political and Economic Factors 
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Argentina’s economy 
boomed.44 With annual growth rates above five percent, Argentina’s 
“standard of living was equal to [that of] the United States.”45 After 
World War II, however, Argentina changed course.46 With the election of 
Juan Domingo Perón, who espoused populist policies, the country 
nationalized several industries.47 As a result, Argentina’s economy 
stagnated: annual growth rates ranged between 0.9% and 3.2% from the 
1950s to the late 1960s, and inflation skyrocketed from 19.6% to 38.1% 
from the 1960s to the 1970s.48 In 1980, “the public sector accounted for 
[twenty seven percent] of Argentina’s GDP.”49  
Despite Argentina’s dismal economy, two regimes in 1980—a 
military regime and Raul Alfonsin’s administration—did not privatize 
many Argentinean SOEs.50 As the Argentinean economy continued to 
deteriorate, voters rejected Alfonsin’s policies and elected Carlos 
Menem, a Perónist, to the presidency.51 Menem, who belonged to a party 
of statists and nationalists, reversed his party’s election platform and 
championed economic liberalization upon taking office.52 
  
 44. Snyder, supra note 1, at 101; see also Alexander J. Loftus & David A. 
McDonald, Of Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology of Water Privatization in Buenos 
Aires, 13 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 179, 179 (2001). 
 45. Snyder, supra note 1, at 101; see also Loftus & McDonald, supra note 44, at 
179. (“[E]conomists confidently predicted that Argentina would soon be second only to 
the US in its economic strength and stature.”).  
 46. See Armijo, supra note 37, at 4; Davidovich, supra note 3, at 153. 
 47. Davidovich, supra note 3, at 153. 
 48. Armijo, supra note 37, at 4. 
 49. Snyder, supra note 1, at 102. 
 50. The military junta refused to privatize any SOEs. Id. Alfonsin, who inherited 
an economy plagued by “triple digit inflation and negative growth,” privatized only four 
SOEs. Armijo, supra note 37, at 8. 
 51. Snyder, supra note 1, at 103. 
 52. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, Privatization in Argentina, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 63, 
69-71 (1994); Loftus & McDonald, supra note 44, at 179. 
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B.  Privatization’s Legal Framework 
“Argentina is ready to triumph . . . and leave this true hell called the 
Third World.” 
-President Carlos Menem53 
Less than two months after Menem became president, the Argentine 
Congress passed Law 23.696, the Administrative Emergency and 
Reorganization of the State Law (“the State Reform Law”).54 The law 
authorized Menem—or the executive generally—“to replace all directors 
or administrators” of SOEs.55 As a result, Menem had the sole authority 
to privatize; if privatization was impossible, then the executive could 
“liquidate [SOEs] entirely.”56 The State Reform Law targeted the 
following SOEs for privatization: airlines, infrastructure, shipping, coal 
mines, oil companies, consulting firms, the postal service, 
telecommunications, utility companies, printing companies, and 
chemical companies.57 With the backing of the State Reform Law, 
Menem sold fifty-one SOEs.58 
In addition to the State Reform Law, the Argentine Congress passed 
Law 23.697, “the Economic Emergency Law.”59 Under the law, the 
executive had the authority to remove SOEs’ existing management and 
install a handpicked “intervenor,” who was accountable only to the 
executive, not the legislature.60  
Scholars agree that both pieces of legislation were procedurally 
“rushed.”61 Although Congress deliberated on other privatization 
  
 53. Davidovich, supra note 3, at 151. 
 54. Law No. 23.696, Aug. 23, 1989, A.D.L.A. (Arg.); Davidovich, supra note 3, 
at 158-59. 
 55. Snyder, supra note 1, at 103. 
 56. Id.; see also Law No. 23.696, supra note 54, at art. XI (Arg.) (codifying the 
liquidation provision). 
 57. Cueto-Rua, supra note 52, at 69. 
 58. Snyder, supra note 1, at 104. 
 59. Law No. 23.697, Sept. 15, 1989, A.D.L.A. (Arg.). 
 60. Cueto-Rua, supra note 52, at 70. 
 61. Cueto-Rua, supra note 52, at 69; Loftus & McDonald, supra note 44, at 182. 
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provisions for ten months, the State Reform Law passed in one month.62 
A month after Congress enacted the State Reform Law, Congress passed 
the Economic Emergency Law.63 Substantively, both laws represented 
special, not popular, interests: Menem’s handpicked economic experts, 
not elected officials, authored both laws.64 
Moreover, scholars—even those who present enthusiastic accounts of 
Menemismo policies65—admit that both laws enabled Menem to 
undermine the Argentine Congress and unilaterally determine the scope 
of various economic liberties.66 Such executive power, however, is not 
completely unusual in context: strong presidential authority is a hallmark 
of several Latin American countries. For example, Argentina grants the 
president the authority “to initiate legislation and make decrees without 
the consent of Congress.”67 Using their broad executive powers, 
Argentine presidents have both created new laws and repealed old ones. 
Menem’s actions, however, increased Argentine executive power in an 
unprecedented manner.68 During his presidency, Menem issued 336 
executive decrees.69 By contrast, previous presidents had issued a total of 
only thirty-five decrees since the 1853 signing of the Argentine 
Constitution.70 
Menem’s executive decrees—often used to further privatization 
programs—subverted congressional power.71 Menem issued decrees to 
sidestep congressional authority, and his decrees substantively affected 
policy areas that were previously under the purview of Congress.72 
  
 62. Daniel Treisman, Cardoso, Menem, and Machiavelli: Political Tactics and 
Privatization in Latin America, 38 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 93, 99 (2003). 
 63. Snyder, supra note 1, at 105. 
 64. SHEVER, supra note 21, at 89. 
 65. Loftus & McDonald, supra note 44, at 179 (using the phrase “Menemismo 
economics”). 
 66. Snyder, supra note 1, at 105. 
 67. SHEVER, supra note 21, at 206 n.4. 
 68. See id. (comparing the number of executive decrees Menem issued vis-à-vis 
the executive decrees issued by previous Argentine presidents). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Roberto Pablo Saba & Luigi Manzetti, Privatization in Argentina: The 
Implications for Corruption, CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 353, 361-62 (1997). 
 72. Id. 
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Although Congress adopted a commission to oversee Menem’s economic 
policies, the commission lacked any veto powers.73 
Moreover, the Argentine Supreme Court did not invalidate Menem’s 
economic policies. To ensure that the Supreme Court would validate his 
actions, Menem increased the number of justices on the Court shortly 
after his election.74 Unsurprisingly, the post-election Court affirmed all of 
Menem’s executive decrees, even though several of them were patently 
unconstitutional.75  
C.  Privatization’s Results 
From 1990 to 1993, privatization raised $18.8 billion for the 
Argentine government.76 In total, the government privatized 
approximately 90% of SOEs by 1994.77 Although privatization raised 
billions of dollars for the Argentine government, not all privatizations 
were successful. For example, after privatization, Aerolíneas Argentinas 
was partially renationalized because the airline increased its prices and 
decreased its level of service.78  
Menem’s privatization process was also plagued by corruption and 
inefficiency. For example, Menem “bought out” capitanes de la 
industria—an organized group of public contractors who initially 
opposed privatization79— by selling them SOEs at below market value 
prices.80 Following privatization, unemployment increased to thirteen 
percent in 1995 and fifteen percent in the late 1990s.81 Several privatized 
firms increased prices even though Argentina’s economy stagnated 
during the late 1990s.82 
  
 73. Id. at 362. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Armijo, supra note 37, at 17. 
 77. Treisman, supra note 62, at 94. 
 78. Saba & Manzetti, supra note 71, at 364.  
 79. Treisman, supra note 62, at 95. 
 80. Id. at 100. 
 81. Loftus & McDonald, supra note 44, at 182. 
 82. Id. 
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Despite such results, some commentators lauded Argentina’s 
privatization. For example, Edward Snyder noted that Argentina’s 
privatizations were “highly unlikely . . . [to] be reversed.”83 Snyder 
further predicted, “Menem’s economic reforms will continue even if he 
must step down in 1995. All of the political parties support the economic 
program, including the opposition Radical Civic Union Party.”84 
Despite Snyder’s predictions, President Néstor Kirchner—a 
Perónist—renationalized several industries in the early 2000s: 
Argentina’s postal service, Argentina’s largest utility company, and 
Aerolíneas Argentinas.85 Kirchner detested foreign investors’ 
monopolistic practices, which presumably increased post-privatization 
inefficiencies.86 Moreover, Kirchner noted that privatization enabled 
investors to profit at the expense of poor Argentine consumers.87 
President Cristina Kirchner, Néstor Kirchner’s wife and successor, 
continued her husband’s renationalization policies.88 Although Menem’s 
pro-privatization policies allowed Argentina to “relinquish[] control of 
the oil and gas industry,”89 Cristina Kirchner succumbed to populist and 
protectionist sentiment and renationalized Argentina’s “biggest oil 
company, YPF.”90  
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The government’s expropriation of YPF chilled Argentina’s 
investment climate: in 2013, the U.S. Department of State cautioned 
investors from increasing their ownership in “Argentine-based assets.”91 
Although the Argentine Constitution requires the government to 
compensate investors prior to expropriation,92 the Kirchner 
Administration did not compensate Repsol, a Spanish company that was 
previously YPF’s majority shareholder, until two years after 
expropriation.93 
III.  PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO 
In contrast to Argentina, Mexico has not renationalized since 
privatization in the late 1980s and early 1990s.94 Prior to the late 1980s, 
however, Mexico cycled between privatization and nationalization.95 
This Part discusses the recent round of Mexican privatizations and their 
results. 
A.  Political and Economic Factors 
Before the 1980s, Mexico had cycled between privatization and 
nationalization.96 Mexico nationalized “hundreds” of businesses under 
President Lázaro Cárdenas’s administration during the Great 
Depression.97 After Cárdenas left office in 1940, Mexico privatized its 
previously nationalized industries.98 Privatization, however, did not last 
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long. In 1958, Mexico renationalized several companies, including 
Telmex—the national telephone company—and foreign-owned power 
companies.99 Mexico’s pro-nationalization policies continued in the 
1970s under Luis Echeverría’s presidency. Echeverría believed that the 
state’s increased economic intervention “would help develop Mexico.”100
 The next decade would prove Echeverría wrong. In 1982, Mexico 
experienced perhaps the worst debt crisis in its history.101 Inflation 
almost reached triple digits,102 and “the budget deficit was [twelve 
percent] of [Mexico’s] GNP.”103 Mexico, therefore, turned to 
privatization. President Miguel de la Madrid “privatized or closed down” 
approximately 750 SOEs.104 President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, de la 
Madrid’s successor, continued to privatize several industries, including 
the state owned telephone, banking, steel, mining, and airline 
companies.105  
B.  Privatization’s Legal Framework 
Although several foreign governments and Mexico’s business elite 
pressured the Mexican government to privatize,106 the government’s 
powers were severely restricted by isolationist, statist policies of the past. 
Since independence, Mexico had cultivated a culture of self-sufficiency, 
obstructing foreign investment and promoting nationalization in the 
process.107 For example, in 1917, Mexico adopted a new constitution that 
restricted foreign investment and nationalized Mexico’s land, water, and 
mineral resources.108 In 1973, when Echeverría championed 
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nationalization, the Mexican Congress passed the Law to Promote 
Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, commonly 
known as the 1973 Foreign Investment Law.109 The law had three main 
provisions: first, certain industries were “reserved” for the Mexican 
government;110 second, another tranche of industries was “reserved” for 
Mexican nationals or Mexican companies;111 third, any remaining 
industries not covered by the previous two provisions had a cap of forty-
nine percent foreign ownership.112 Thus, to privatize, Salinas used his 
executive power to issue the 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations (“the 
Regulations”).113  
Salinas’s executive powers, however, were limited. Article 89(1) of 
the Mexican Constitution limited the scope of presidential rule-making, 
only permitting those regulations that “explain[ed] and suppl[ied] 
detailed rules for the application of specific laws.”114 Moreover, the 
Mexican Supreme Court had previously proscribed regulations that 
“contravene[d]” existing law.115 Thus, even though Latin American 
executives traditionally enjoyed broad executive powers,116 the Mexican 
Constitution prevented Salinas from using his rule-making power to 
repeal the 1973 Foreign Investment Law.  
The 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations, therefore, were limited in 
scope. Through the Regulations, Salinas curtailed the authority of the 
administrative agency that enforced the 1973 Foreign Investment Law.117 
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Salinas also authorized Series N shares, a class of stock that had no 
voting rights but allowed foreign investors to share in capital gains and 
dividends in privatized SOEs.118 Ultimately, the Regulations were 
Salinas’s attempt to promote private property rights and enhance 
competition throughout Mexico.119 
The Regulations, however, were initially ineffectual. Perhaps because 
of Salinas’s limited constitutional authority or Mexico’s history of 
renationalization, there was no mad rush to purchase shares in Mexican 
SOEs. In 1990, the year after the Regulations were promulgated, direct 
foreign investment decreased.120  
From a legal perspective, however, the Regulations may have 
empowered the Mexican Congress to codify Salinas’s economic 
reforms.121 After two years of deliberation, the Mexican Congress 
enacted the 1993 Foreign Investment Law.122 The Law repealed the 1973 
Foreign Investment Law, but did not overturn restrictions on foreign 
investment in the oil, banking, and television industries; these industries 
continued to remain under the purview of either state or “private 
monopolies.”123 The 1993 Foreign Investment Law also codified 
Salinas’s 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations, thereby increasing 
certainty and predictability.124 
In 1994, with the ratification of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”), Mexico further strengthened its protection of 
private property rights.125 NAFTA’s investment provisions attempt to 
“create a secure investment climate through the promulgation of clear 
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rules for the fair treatment of foreign investors.”126 Moreover, Chapter 11 
of NAFTA proscribes expropriation unless four conditions are met: the 
country (1) has a public purpose for expropriation; (2) expropriates on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, (3) in accordance with the due process of law; 
and (4) offers fair market value compensation for the expropriated 
entity.127 
C. Privatization’s Results 
From 1989 to 1992, privatization generated revenues that were 
equivalent to 6.3% of Mexican GDP.128 From December 1990 to June 
1993, privatization generated $18.1 billion for the Mexican 
government.129 In total, by 1994, Mexico reduced its SOEs from 1,100 to 
200; most of the 200 SOEs were in sectors that could not be privatized.130 
In key privatizations, the Mexican government and privatizers limited 
inefficiencies by protecting certain constituencies.131 For example, after 
the privatization of Telmex—the state owned telephone company—the 
privatizers agreed to maintain pre-privatization employment, thereby 
curbing populist discontent.132 Moreover, as part of the concession for 
Telmex’s sale, the privatizers promised the government that Telmex 
would modernize its services.133 Thus, the privatized company completed 
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an $8 billion modernization program, transitioning from analog lines to 
digital lines and advancing social welfare in the process.134  
Additionally, the Mexican government avoided bitter populist clashes 
by refusing to privatize certain SOEs, including rural land.135 In Mexico 
and Latin America, rural land has signified the gap between the “haves” 
and “have-nots,” and governments have implemented various land 
redistribution schemes to reduce inequity.136 Although the Mexican 
government granted itself the constitutional authority to privatize 
communal land, called ejidos, “the vast majority” of Mexican ejidos have 
remained unprivatized.137 Such actions may have curbed populist 
resistance to privatization efforts, restraining populist uprisings against 
pro-privatization administrations.138  
Despite the Mexican government’s efforts to increase post-
privatization efficiencies, some commentators have criticized Mexico’s 
privatizations. In particular, Sam Overman notes that Mexico’s reliance 
on foreign investment has “recolonized” the Mexican economy.139 
Moreover, Overman argues that privatization has not democratized 
ownership in the Mexican economy: “wealthy . . . Mexican investors” 
and foreign investors own most privatized assets.140 Lastly, according to 
Overman, even successful privatizations—for example the privatization 
of Telmex141—“[c]reat[ed] new [privately owned] monopolies” and have 
failed to foster competition.142  
Despite such inefficiencies, the Mexican government has continued to 
champion privatization and has protected private property rights for 
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foreign and domestic investors alike.143 In 2012, the government eased 
restrictions on SOEs that were previously “reserved” for the state.144 For 
example, the Mexican government enacted regulations that made 
Pemex—Mexico’s state-owned oil company—“more enticing to foreign 
participation.”145 While “talk of ‘privatizing’ Pemex” may have been 
“political suicide” two years ago,146 President Enrique Pena Nieto 
recently signed legislation that “open[s] . . . [Pemex] to private 
investment.”147  
IV.  PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Scholars universally agree that the U.K.’s privatization in the 1980s 
was successful;148 after completion, several of the U.K. privatizations 
served as a “blueprint” for other countries.149 This Part discusses the 
U.K.’s privatizations under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher.  
A.  Political and Economic Factors 
The U.K. conducted a round of nationalization in the 1940s, under 
Clement Attlee’s labour government.150 Attlee nationalized to rebuild 
Great Britain’s postwar economy; at the time, government officials 
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wrongly believed that nationalization would spur modernization.151 
Unlike the mass nationalizations in Latin America,152 British 
nationalization was conducted on a case-by-case basis.153 The 
government nationalized industries such as defense, energy, and utilities, 
but the government’s nationalization program also encompassed 
companies that were insolvent at the time.154 
By the late 1970s, Great Britain’s nationalized industries were 
woefully inefficient and unproductive. “Massive portions” of the 
populace were “dependent on the state for their housing, education, and 
livelihoods.”155 By 1979, 29.3% of the labor force was employed by the 
government or by nationalized industries.156 Nationalized industries, in 
turn, received 4.6 billion GBP in government subsidies.157 
Additionally, in 1979, the British economy stagnated. Inflation 
reached eighteen percent, and “[t]he British pound sank to one-twentieth 
[of] the purchasing power it had forty years earlier.”158 Despite high 
inflation and low purchasing power, tax rates remained extraordinarily 
high: the highest tax bracket was eighty-three percent.159 
Amidst the economic turmoil, Margaret Thatcher, then the 
Conservative Opposition Leader, moved for a no-confidence vote against 
Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan.160 The House of Commons 
granted Thatcher’s motion by one vote, compelling Callaghan to call an 
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early election.161 On May 4, 1979, the Conservative Party won the 
general election, and Thatcher became the U.K.’s prime minister.162  
During the 1979 election, the Conservative Party had no plans to 
conduct a wide scale privatization program.163 Upon assuming office, 
Thatcher did not conduct any major privatizations during her first 
term.164 Nevertheless, as the economy continued to decline, Thatcher 
championed privatization during her second and third terms.165  
B.  Privatization’s Legal Framework 
Unlike the privatizations in Mexico and Argentina, privatization in the 
U.K. was a much more gradual process. Each individual privatization 
required parliamentary approval through an Act of Parliament.166 
Moreover, unlike Menem,167 Thatcher did not privatize immediately 
upon becoming prime minister.168 
British Telecom was the first major company that the Thatcher 
Administration privatized.169 In 1982, the government first announced 
that it planned to sell a majority stake of British Telecom.170 Two years 
later, Parliament authorized its sale by passing the Telecommunications 
Act of 1984 (“the Act”).171 In addition to authorizing British Telecom’s 
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sale, the Act created a regulator for the privatized company: the Office of 
Telecommunications.172  
The privatization of British Telecom was wildly successful. The sale 
was the largest IPO in international financial history at the time and 
generated “almost [four billion GBP]” for the U.K. government.173 
Following British Telecom’s privatization, the Thatcher Administration 
privatized other companies, including state-owned gas, electricity, water, 
steel, and coal companies.174 Ultimately, the Thatcher Administration, 
with the authorization of Parliament, privatized more than fifty 
companies, including modern day brand names such as British 
Petroleum, Jaguar, British Airways, and Rolls-Royce.175 
C.  Privatization’s Results 
During the Thatcher Administration, privatization raised 
approximately fifty-billion pound sterling.176 Despite such astronomical 
revenues, Thatcher’s privatization policies still attracted criticism. For 
example, some accused Thatcher of selling “state jewels at bargain 
prices.”177  
Privatization experts, however, regard Thatcher’s policies as “by and 
large successful.”178 Several privatizing countries viewed the U.K. 
privatizations as “blueprint[s]” for their own privatization programs.179 
Thatcher’s successor, Prime Minister John Major, continued to privatize 
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SOEs.180 More recently, in 2013, the U.K. privatized Royal Mail, the 
country’s postal service.181 
Like Menem, who “bought out” privatization’s opponents, Thatcher 
offered employees and customers shares of SOEs at below-market 
prices.182 Perhaps to democratize ownership, the government primarily 
marketed shares to British consumers, not foreigners.183 Others, however, 
dispute Thatcher’s motives in selling to employees and domestic 
investors. For example, one news source states that Thatcher sold shares 
to employees to dilute unions’ opposition to privatization.184  
In addition to promoting private property rights, Thatcher’s initiatives 
unleashed the administrative state. With each privatization, Parliament 
and the Thatcher Administration created an overseeing administrative 
agency.185 Such agencies did not reduce government involvement in the 
economy, but may have contributed to British privatization’s success for 
two reasons.186 First, administrative agencies may have enabled markets 
to function efficiently, thereby increasing privatization’s efficacy.187 
Second, by promoting efficient markets, agencies also promoted investor 
confidence—a crucial facet of any privatization program that 
democratizes corporate ownership.188  
V.  AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION 
Although the previous Parts discussed the constitutional and legal 
framework of each privatization, this Part (1) synthesizes constitutional 
and economic policies associated with each privatization and (2) offers 
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prescriptions for curtailing the privatization-nationalization cycle and 
preserving economic liberties. 
A.  Executive Power 
Among all three countries, Argentina grants its head of state the most 
executive power. As described in Part II, Argentine presidents may 
repeal legislation and issue decrees without Congress’s consent.189 Such 
broad powers enable Argentine presidents to allocate property rights 
singlehandedly: for example, Menem unilaterally privatized ninety 
percent of Argentina’s SOEs from 1991 to 1994.190 
By contrast, executive power in Mexico and the U.K. is significantly 
weaker. Although Latin American presidents enjoy broad executive 
powers,191 Mexican presidents cannot use their executive power to 
“contravene” existing law.192 Similarly, although parliamentary systems 
do not separate power between the legislature and executive,193 the 
U.K.’s prime ministers cannot unilaterally privatize and nationalize.194 
Such restrictions invariably curb the executive’s ability to modify the 
status quo. For example, Salinas could not autocratically repeal the 1973 
Foreign Investment Law.195 Conversely, Salinas’s (hypothetical) 
antithesis—if ever elected—cannot unilaterally undo legislation passed 
during Salinas’s term in office. In the U.K., Thatcher could not 
independently privatize SOEs. Moreover, if Thatcher’s actions were to 
generate discontent in the House of Commons, Members of Parliament 
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could make a motion of no confidence, dissolving the government and 
calling an early election.196 
In the context of privatization, executives with relatively weak 
executive powers197 are unlikely to sanction swift changes in private 
property rights, constitutional provisions, and longstanding practices. 
Thus, weak executive power may decrease the likelihood that a country 
cycles between privatization and nationalization. Moreover, if a country 
has already privatized, weak executive power may also lead to 
entrenchment. Entrenchment, in turn, promotes economic liberties: if the 
executive cannot unilaterally modify existing law, then a country is more 
likely to “enshrine[]” certainty in its legal system, increasing investment 
and property ownership.198  
Hence, to avoid renationalization, countries adopting privatization 
policies should simultaneously curb executive power. Restraints on 
executive power need not be all-encompassing; instead, the restraint 
should only limit the executive’s unilateral ability to modify preexisting 
legal and constitutional provisions.199 Such limitations on executive 
power are more likely to entrench privatization policies. If privatization 
becomes more of a permanent fixture—as opposed to a policy to be 
adopted and discarded at each executive’s discretion—then privatization 
is more likely to foster certainty, increase investment, and promote 
economic liberties.200  
Despite weak executive power’s benefits, some may argue that strong 
executive power201 frees a country’s ability to privatize rapidly. Menem, 
for instance, could not have privatized as rapidly as he did if his 
executive powers were limited. Although weak executive powers lend 
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more permanence to a set of policy preferences, permanence is desirable 
in the context of private ownership and economic liberties. Permanence 
enshrines certainty, thereby increasing investment and property 
ownership.202 By contrast, impermanence decreases certainty and stifles 
ownership and investment.203 Therefore, at least in the long run, weak 
executive powers—not strong executive powers—are more likely to (1) 
curb renationalization efforts and (2) promote private investment.  
Lastly, Menem’s example cannot refute the case for weak executive 
power. Although Menem used his executive powers to privatize, 
Menem’s hypothetical antithesis would be equally able to use executive 
powers to renationalize; in fact, because of Argentina’s strong executive 
powers, Menem’s hypothetical antithesis may renationalize just as 
rapidly as Menem privatized. Therefore, strong executive power does not 
necessarily make privatization a more likely outcome;204 instead, strong 
executive power increases the likelihood that a country will cycle 
between privatization and nationalization. 
B.  Legislative Entrenchment 
Although the executive may entrench existing law through his or her 
inaction, the legislature can entrench laws through deliberate action. 
Legislative entrenchment is defined by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
as statutes “that are binding against subsequent legislative action.”205 
Posner and Vermeule suggest that legislative entrenchment can be 
accomplished through statutes that require a two-thirds majority to be 
repealed.206  
None of the examples discussed in this Article fit Posner and 
Vermeule’s exact definition of legislative entrenchment. The examples, 
however, lend plausibility to the argument that countries that perpetuate 
private property rights through legislation are more likely to have 
successful privatization programs. For example, in 1989, Mexico had 
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trouble attracting capital partly because its foreign investment regulations 
were not yet enshrined in legislation.207 On the other hand, the U.K. 
arguably compensated for its inability to entrench legislation—the 
current Parliament is not bound by acts passed by previous 
Parliaments208—by passing successive acts of Parliament that privatized 
several SOEs.209 By continuing to privatize SOEs through several 
legislative terms, Parliament tacitly entrenched privatization within the 
U.K. and promoted economic liberties. 
Therefore, when privatizing,210 the legislature should entrench pro-
privatization laws, including laws protecting investment and private 
property. By perpetuating private property rights, governments decrease 
the likelihood that a country will renationalize. Moreover, legislative 
entrenchment “enables a government to make a credible commitment” to 
a particular policy—in this case, privatization.211 Such a commitment, in 
turn, increases predictability and private ownership.212 
Aside from Posner and Vermeule, legislative entrenchment receives 
support from a wide range of authorities. James Madison, for example, 
noted that “most of the rights of property[] would become absolutely 
defunct” if the legislature did not entrench “rights depending on positive 
laws.”213 Furthermore, privatization experts have acknowledged that 
entrenchment “enshrine[s]” certainty in a country’s legal system, thereby 
attracting investment.214 
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Despite legislative entrenchment’s potential, certain regimes cannot 
entrench laws as Posner and Vermeule suggest.215 Indeed, certain 
regimes—for example, the U.K.—cannot entrench laws at all.216 
Therefore, for these countries, a system of tacit entrenchment may be a 
more viable alternative.217 For instance, a country can privatize SOEs in 
different legislative terms, thus assuring investors that different 
legislatures are equally committed to preserving private property rights.  
C. Distributional Concerns 
Distributional inequities may serve as a rallying cry for 
nationalization. For example, in Argentina, Néstor Kirchner 
renationalized because privatization enabled foreign investors to profit at 
the expense of poor Argentines.218 Cristina Kirchner likewise 
renationalized in response to populist concerns.219 Moreover, Argentina’s 
poor and labor unions supported both presidents’ renationalization 
efforts.220  
By contrast, Mexico curbed populist sentiment through a number of 
ex ante measures: while privatizing, the Mexican government negotiated 
for provisions that would modernize SOEs and maintain pre-privatization 
employment.221 More importantly, the Mexican government refused to 
privatize rural land, which symbolically represented bitter clashes 
between the rich and the poor.222 Even though Mexico’s privatizations 
“recolonized” the economy and concentrated ownership among foreign 
and “wealthy individual Mexican investors,” Mexico’s ex ante measures 
may have countered anti-privatization sentiment among the poor and 
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labor unions.223 Since privatization in the early 1990s, Mexico has not 
succumbed to populist pressure and renationalized.224 
Even though distributional inequities stoke populist discontent, it 
would be a mistake to assume that anti-privatization sentiment lacks 
another cause: results that lag (often inflated) expectations. Governments 
often market privatization as an economic panacea, but poorly managed 
privatizations may leave the polity worse off than before. Menem, for 
example, remarked that that privatization would bring prosperity and 
enable Argentina to “leave [the] true hell called the Third World.”225 
Argentina’s privatization, however, did not lift the masses out of poverty; 
instead, unemployment and prices simultaneously increased, enriching 
privatized industries over Argentine consumers.226 In law and economics 
terms, Menem promised the polity a Pareto improvement, an outcome 
that leaves no one worse off.227 The end result, however, was a Pareto 
efficiency, an outcome in which one party—in this case, the citizenry—
was worse off.228  
Therefore, any policy that seeks to curb populist discontent—and by 
extension, the privatization-nationalization cycle—must also reduce 
distributional inequities and align results with expectations. Perhaps one 
policy that can alleviate maldistribution and realign results with 
expectations is a modernization agreement. Such agreements deliver 
tangible benefits to the populace, including the poor, thereby reducing 
distributional concerns. Moreover, modernization agreements—which 
are governed by contract law—enable the government to align 
privatization’s results with the citizenry’s expectations.  
Mexico has utilized modernization agreements in its privatizations. 
For example, Telmex—a state-run monopoly plagued by operational 
inefficiency—was privatized under a modernization agreement.229 The 
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government’s modernization provisions required Telmex’s privatizers to 
modernize telephone services throughout Mexico.230 Such provisions 
increased privatization’s benefits and likely increased overall social 
welfare.231 
CONCLUSION 
Privatization receives immense constitutional support, but several 
G20 democracies have cycled back and forth between privatization and 
nationalization. This Article compares and contrasts privatizations in 
Argentina, Mexico, and the United Kingdom to identify (1) why certain 
countries renationalize, and (2) how privatizing regimes can safeguard 
private property rights. By studying each privatization’s constitutional 
and legal framework, this Article argues that two constitutional factors 
and one economic factor impact the privatization-nationalization cycle: 
(1) executive power, (2) legislative entrenchment, and (3) distributional 
inequities. The first and third factors increase the likelihood that a 
country will renationalize. The second factor, however, may promote 
investment and private property rights. Thus, this Article recommends 
that privatizing nations dilute executive power, increase legislative 
entrenchment, and reduce distributional inequities. In the past, countries 
have singularly and tacitly adopted such measures. In the future, 
however, privatizing countries should concurrently and explicitly adopt 
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